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We consider the effect of various organizational resources on political contributions. Using a unique
data set of soft money contributors from 1997 to 1998, our resource-based model examines how
capital, membership, and experience influence the decision to give money to political parties. By
observing decision making in a relatively unconstrained regulatory environment typified by the soft
money regime, we demonstrate the conventional wisdom that financial resources determine the size
of political contributions. Financial wealth, however, does not predict whether an organization will
make a contribution in the first place. Instead, we show that a lack of alternative resources makes it
more likely that organizations will spend money on politics. These findings have important implica-
tions for determining who benefits under various campaign finance rules.
During the 1990s, soft money contributions emerged as a new strategy for inter-
est groups to influence politics in the United States. In the decade spanning the
1992 and 2002 elections, soft money contributions to political parties surged from
$86 to $496 million (Federal Election Commission 2003). These contributions
were not subject to limits imposed by federal campaign finance rules in the
1970s.1 Given evidence of public concern about the potential for large contribu-
tions to corrupt the political system, Congress responded by passing the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in 2001 soon after the collapse of Enron,
an energy corporation that was widely perceived as using its soft money dona-
tions to avoid federal regulations.2 While policy debates focused on the donations
of the so-called “fat cats,” there was little knowledge about the wider population
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 66, No. 4, November 2004, Pp. 1134–1154
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1 Soft money was a name coined in the 1980s for the contributions to political parties that exceed
the limits established by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its amendments.
According to the FECA, political parties could use soft money for party building activities such as
voter mobilization and organizational expenses, but not for direct support of federal candidates.
2 Soft money contributions to national party committees were banned by the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, which was signed by President Bush on March 27. The new campaign finance
legislation took effect November 6, 2002, after the close of the 2002 federal election cycle.
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of soft money contributors. Who were these groups? What led them to contribute?
Until recently, scholars lacked the data to examine these basic questions.
We assembled a unique data set comparing soft and hard money contributors,
as well as noncontributors, to examine what kinds of groups made soft money
contributions. Based on an analysis of organizational resources, we find—unsur-
prisingly—that the soft money system advantaged an exclusive set of donors
made up of wealthy organizations that were allied with one or the other major
political party. Among soft money donors, large membership groups, such as
labor unions and advocacy organizations, were most likely to make generous
donations to political parties. However, the loosely regulated soft money regime
allowed small business interests, with little prior experience in politics, to par-
ticipate in greater numbers than ever.
By addressing questions about the resource characteristics of groups con-
tributing soft money and making comparisons to hard money contributors, it is
possible to see how a unique set of campaign finance rules affect political par-
ticipation and the representation of interests in the United States. Our thesis is
that changing the rules on political contributions affects groups differently
depending on the range and quantity of their political resources. In the conclu-
sion we discuss the implications of our findings on political participation for dif-
ferent kinds of organizations.
Previous Studies of Interest Group Contributions
Scholars tend to focus on three factors to explain interest group contribution
patterns: organizational goals, political context, and resources. By far, the factor
that receives the most attention is organizational goals. The classic dichotomy 
is to compare groups with access goals to groups with electoral goals (see 
Herrnson 2000; Sorauf 1992). Access-oriented groups (typically described as
business organizations) make contributions to build relationships with sitting
members of the legislature who might help them advance particularistic policies
(Hall and Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986), while electoral-oriented groups (a 
classification that usually describes advocacy groups and labor unions) seek to
change the composition of the legislature by supporting challengers who 
espouse their views (Eismeier and Pollock 1988; Gopoian 1984; Humphries
1991; Wilcox 1994). Overall, there is strong empirical support for a theoretical
approach that emphasizes interest group goals to explain the contribution strate-
gies of corporate and labor political action committees or PACs (Eismeier 
and Pollock 1988; Endersby and Munger 1992; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991,
1993; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Handler and Mulkern 1982; Masters and
Zardkoohi 1988).
The second most common approach is to think of interest groups as strategic
actors that vary their activities depending on the political context (Hansen 1991;
Jacobson and Kernell 1981). Interest groups vary their political contributions
depending on the favorability of the issue environment (Eismeier and Pollock
The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions 1135
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1986a, 1986b, 1988; Handler and Mulkern 1982), which party has majority status
(Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph 1999), the committee assignments of candidates
(Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Munger 1989), perceptions of member power
(Grentzke 1989) and the direction of short-term party trends (Jacobson and
Kernell 1981). Individual organizations also make decisions about participation
based on their expectations about the behavior of other similarly situated organ-
izations (Conybeare and Squire 1994; Gray and Lowery 1997; Hart 2001; Masters
and Keim 1985).
A third and underutilized approach is to examine how group resources affect
political contributions. Scholars acknowledge the importance of resources in
organizational decision making (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Berry 1997;
Rozell and Wilcox 1998; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Wright
1996), yet few studies test explicitly the relationship between resources and 
political contributions. Those that study this relationship tend to confine 
themselves to the relationship between financial resources and contributions
(Masters and Keim 1985; Wilcox 1989) and the employees or members of the
organization who can be solicited for funds (Conybeare and Squire 1994;
Delaney, Fiorito, and Masters 1988; Masters and Keim 1985). The conventional
wisdom is that financial resources have a direct relationship to the level of a
group’s political activity. The more money available to a group, the more it spends
on politics.
One limitation of previous studies of interest group behavior is that they rely
almost entirely on hard money contributions by PACs, which are regulated by
federal laws limiting the source and size of contributions.3 Since hard money con-
tributions are capped, they reflect an imperfect expression of interest group pref-
erence to make donations to political committees. No matter how intensely an
interest organization favors a candidate or party, it cannot contribute more than
the amounts set by law. No contribution caps, however, existed under the soft
money regime. Under these unconstrained circumstances, it is possible to observe
the effect of organizational wealth and other resources on the willingness to make
political contributions.
Another limitation of previous studies is that they fail to consider the extent
to which nonfinancial resources influence political contribution strategies. Orga-
nizations, for example, may have large memberships, special legal status, or
useful knowledge. To some extent, these kinds of resources are substitutes for
money. Rather than make political contributions, it may be more effective for 
an organization to use members for grassroots activity, or draw on specialized
knowledge by testifying at congressional hearings and government panels. In
short, organizations that possess a range of resources may not need to rely as
much on cash for political influence.
3 When we speak of PACs, we refer specifically to what the Federal Election Commission refers to
as multicandidate committees.
This content downloaded from 
            128.218.42.140 on Tue, 09 Jul 2019 00:00:13 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Resource-Based Perspective on Soft Money Contributions
Resources matter in organizational decisions for obvious reasons. Political
organizations use resources to hire lobbyists, mobilize followers, or make con-
tributions to political committees. The strategies they choose depend not only on
goals and the electoral context, but the resources that are available to them. An
organization that advocates for the poor may want to hire powerful lobbyists or
make large political contributions, but lacking money they are more likely to rely
on grassroots efforts and alliances with other groups. In contrast, a profitable
business firm seeking particularistic policy goals will likely hire influential lob-
byists or form a political action committee to make contributions to candidates,
or both.
We test a theory of political contributions by examining the effect of three dif-
ferent kinds of resources on the decision to donate soft money: (1) capital (2)
membership, and (3) experience. Our fundamental assumption is that different
kinds of resources can be substituted for each other to some extent in the effort
to influence politics. We expect that capital matters the most and that the wealth-
iest organizations make the largest contributions when there are no restrictions.
However, if organizations possess other kinds of resources, such as members or
political experience, they have weaker incentives to make financial contributions
ceteris paribus because they have alternative strategic options that may be more
cost effective. Among politically active groups, membership is a key resource for
gaining credibility among legislators (Wright 1996) and for pursuing grassroots
strategies (Hojackni and Kimball 1999). The American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP), for example, makes no direct political contributions, yet they
gain access to officeholders because they claim to represent millions of senior
citizens who can be mobilized for grassroots lobbying. In fact, making political
contributions through a PAC could generate significant costs for the AARP by
creating divisive factions within the organization that oppose particular contri-
butions to candidates or parties. Thus, it is more cost effective for the AARP to
avoid political contributions and focus on lobbying and alternative forms of polit-
ical participation.
Other groups, such as the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club, make
political contributions and mobilize members of their organization during elec-
toral campaigns by sending them political mail, newsletters, and contacting them
by telephone (Magleby 2002). For such groups, there is a trade-off between
making political contributions and mobilizing members. Money they spend on
contributions cannot be used to communicate with members. The less these
organizations spend on communications to inform and excite members, the less
support they receive from them (Delaney, Fiorito, and Masters 1988). Thus,
leaders of these organizations must strike a balance. All other resources being
equal, we expect membership organizations are less likely to make soft money
contributions than nonmembership organizations, which have fewer strategic
options.
The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions 1137
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Membership organizations, however, are not all alike. Voluntary membership
organizations must offer inducements to attract members, usually some selective
benefit that encourages individuals to join (Olson 1965) or purposive benefits that
focus on broader policy goals (Wilson 1974). Involuntary organizations, in con-
trast, have “captive” members who are coerced into joining if they pursue a
certain occupation. The typical involuntary organization is a labor union. While
voluntary organizations must solicit dues from existing and potential members,
involuntary organizations frequently collect dues by garnishing the paychecks of
members.
Voluntary membership groups will be less likely to make soft money contri-
butions because leaders of these organizations have an incentive to emphasize
mobilization strategies as a way of generating additional support for the organi-
zation. Advocacy groups, for example, must consider the trade-off between using
their resources for political contributions and member mobilization. Involuntary
membership groups have a more secure and steady source of income that can be
used for political contributions since membership dues are deducted automati-
cally from individual paychecks, making it easier for labor unions than for vol-
untary membership groups to raise money.
The third resource we examine is organizational experience. Over time, organ-
izations build political relationships, learn new strategies, and improve their effi-
ciency at accomplishing goals. Some organizations, such as the AFL-CIO and
the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), have
been active in politics for over a hundred years. Others, like Microsoft, are rela-
tive newcomers that have only recently become politically active. As organiza-
tions gain experience, they are more likely to increase the complexity of their
political strategies. We believe that experienced organizations tend to pursue mul-
tiple strategies to secure political goals as part of the learning process (March
and Olsen 1984). As a result, they were more likely to make soft money contri-
butions. However, experience itself also serves as a substitute for money. Expe-
rience in politics helps establish reputations, strengthen political ties, and increase
credibility. All other factors being equal, more experienced organizations should
require fewer political contributions to exert influence. For this reason, among
groups that contribute, we expect less experienced organizations to make larger
soft money contributions.
To explain which groups made soft money contributions we divide our analy-
sis into two critical organizational decisions. The first decision was whether the
group chooses to make a soft money contribution of any amount. For this deci-
sion, we select a random sample from the population of organizations that are
already politically active (see explanation in data section below) to observe which
groups chose to augment their existing strategies by making a soft money con-
tribution. The second decision organizations confronted was how much soft
money they wanted to contribute, given that they had already chosen to make a
soft money contribution. In this step, we select a subset from the previous random
sample that includes only groups that made a soft money contribution to the polit-
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ical parties.4 Applying these two decisions we put forward the following 
hypotheses:
Decision 1: Whether to make a soft money contribution
Capital: The more money and employees that an organization possesses, the
more likely it will be to make a soft money contribution.
Membership: Membership organizations (labor unions and advocacy groups)
are less likely to make a soft money contribution than nonmembership organ-
izations (business firms). Among membership organizations, voluntary associ-
ations (advocacy groups) are the least likely to make a soft money contribution.
Experience: Older organizations are more likely to make a soft money 
contribution.
Decision 2: The size of the soft money contribution
Capital: The more money and employees that an organization possesses, the
more soft money it will contribute.
Membership: Membership organizations (labor unions and advocacy groups)
will contribute less soft money than nonmembership organizations (business
firms). Among membership organizations, voluntary groups will contribute less
soft money than involuntary groups (labor unions).
Experience: The older an organization, the less soft money it will contribute.
Data and Methods
We combine data on interest group characteristics and political contributions
during the 1998 election cycle to analyze the effects of organizational capital,
membership, and experience on decisions to make soft money contributions. In
the first part of our analysis, we use a logit model to explain whether an interest
group makes a soft money contribution. In the second part, we use an ordinary
least-squares model to explain factors that influence the size of soft money 
contributions.
We generated our sample of organizations from a master list of all organiza-
tions listed in Washington Representatives, which attempts to catalog all interest
groups that engage in any kind of national political activity. This kind of politi-
cal engagement may include lobbying, testifying before Congress, making polit-
ical contributions, or claiming that following national politics was a priority.5 Our
4 The two-part model is discussed in detail in Manning, Duan, and Rogers (1987). This Monte Carlo
study compared the use of sample selection and two-part models, determining that two-part models
were as good or better than sample selection models in the absence of extreme values of the inde-
pendent variable. A later article by Leung and Yu (1996), while noting weaknesses in the Manning,
Duan, and Rogers (1987) comparison of the sample selection and two-part models, nonetheless points
to the strength of this model under certain conditions, and the two-part model does appear to be the
appropriate choice for our data.
5 Ideally, we would review the population of every organized group in United States, but we could
not possibly catalogue such a list. Instead, we observed the population of organizations that claimed
to be active in national politics, in some way, as identified by Washington Representatives. Among
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10% sample of 1,066 organizations was split fairly evenly between firms and
associations (which includes trade associations, voluntary organizations, profes-
sional groups, public interest groups, or labor unions), with each type of group
making up approximately 45% of the data, and governments making up the
remaining 10%.6 We added detailed information on organizational background,
resources, issue environment, and expenditures.7
To measure the capital of an organization, we used organizational revenues.
We expect the variable revenues to be positively correlated with the decision to
make soft money contributions and the size of contributions. We also include a
measure of organizational size, specifically the number of employees in the organ-
ization. Employee size constitutes the real or potential pool of donors that organ-
izations may draw upon to solicit political donations (see Conybeare and Squire
1994). Typically, business firms solicit funds for their affiliated PACs from man-
agerial executives.8 The number of employees also serves as a proxy for mem-
bership size for associations.9
To measure whether an organization has members we distinguish between
groups that typically have members and those that do not. In our classification,
advocacy groups and labor unions reflect membership groups, while business
firms are nonmembership groups. Given that membership is a substitute resource
for money, we expect the variables advocacy groups and labor unions to be neg-
atively related to the decision to make soft money contributions and the size of
contributions. We expect the variable firm to be positively correlated with both
decisions.
We classify firms, advocacy groups, labor unions, trade associations, and pro-
fessional associations based on their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
these organizations our goal is to understand which ones chose to make soft money contributions.
Thus, our sample is biased in the sense that it selects organizations already involved in politics to
some degree, and our results should only be generalized within this population of organizations. The
sample, however, does not select on the dependent variable because Washington Representatives lists
any organization that claims to conduct one or more of a variety of political activities. Making polit-
ical contributions is not the basis for being listed in this resource.
6 Governments are included in Washington Representatives because they engage in some political
activities, particularly lobbying. They are not included in this analysis because governments may not
make soft money contributions.
7 Background information on corporations used in this analysis was drawn from the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System) filings
and from public information on firms posted to online business directories. Background information
on associations was drawn from Associations Unlimited, which provides a range of information on
associations such as founding date, primary activities, issue areas, membership, dues, total budget,
revenues, and number of employees  (Gale Research 2003). In addition, public information provided
by the organizations themselves was added when it was available.
8 Firms can only contribute hard money to candidates by raising funds from managerial employ-
ees through firm-sponsored PACs. As the size of the managerial pool increases, so does the potential
for raising money.
9 All but the smallest associations typically hire salaried staff to perform political work, and staff
size increases with the size of their membership, even though there are some economies of scale for
very large organizations.
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codes, which are generally accepted measures that indicate the type of activity
that organizations engage in, regardless of whether or not the organization is for
profit or nonprofit.10 Trade and professional organizations, in addition to social
service associations such as civic and fraternal groups, typically occupy theoret-
ical territory somewhere between firms and membership organizations in the 
discussion of organizational behavior. As a result, trade and professional 
organizations are the baseline (suppressed) group in our model that we use to
make comparisons with the other kinds of organizations.
We measure experience by the age of the organization. This information is
available from various sources, including Associations Unlimited (Gale Research
2003) and the Securities and Exchange Commission. We expect the variable orga-
nizational age to be positively correlated with the decision to make a contribu-
tion (because experienced organizations seek more complex strategies) but
negatively correlated to the size of the contribution (because experience is a sub-
stitute resource for money). We also test for differential age effects among types
of organizations since some may become active in politics more quickly than
others.
We controlled for the size of the interest group population active in the same
issue area. Individual organizations make decisions about participation based on
their expectations about the behavior of similarly situated organizations (Olson
1965). Some research shows that groups participate less as the population of sim-
ilarly situated organizations increases (Conybeare and Squire 1994; Masters and
Keim 1985) while others argue the opposite (Gray and Lowery 1997). We remain
agnostic about the direction of influence of population-level characteristics since
we are concerned primarily with organizational resources.
The data for the dependent variable, soft money contributions, come from the
Center for Responsive Politics’ (CRP) database on all soft money contributors
during the 1998 election cycle. We removed individual contributors and then sum-
marized contributions by each sponsoring organization. The decision to include
individual contributors in the dataset might introduce unknown biases since it is
unclear empirically whether these donors make contributions based on organiza-
tional affiliation or based on other criteria, such as ideology, partisan identifica-
tion, or a single issue that is unrelated to organizational affiliation.11
The 1998 midterm was a fairly representative election cycle during the decade
that soft money was raised and spent. There were slender majorities in the U.S.
House and Senate, raising the stakes for the major parties and their supporters.
Similar to previous midterm elections, most candidates ran on issues put forth
10 Advocacy groups are classified by issue area based on assigned secondary Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes or primary NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System) code.
Trade associations were identified by their separate four-digit SIC code, as were labor unions and
professional organizations.
11 The Federal Election Commission provides no background data about individual soft 
money donors, so we could not link them to particular organizations even if we had felt this was
appropriate.
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by party policy memos and press releases (Herrnson 2000). One important dif-
ference was that the number of soft money contributors increased dramatically
between the 1994 and 1998 midterm, from 4,856 to 12,253, primarily because
the value of soft money increased during the 1996 elections when parties began
using it extensively for campaign advertisements.12 However, the distribution of
contributors remained remarkably similar across election cycles, even during
presidential years when contributions typically surge because of the added excite-
ment and national publicity. Table 1, which contains a sample of soft money
donors from elections in 1992 through 2000 shows that firms have comprised
roughly nine in ten donors since soft money statistics were first compiled by the
Federal Election Commission. Among firms, the distribution within subcategories
is fairly consistent across time, with two groups dominating contributions,
12 The number of contributors also spiked in 1996 (18,588) compared with 1992 (5,210). In 2000,
the increase was not as dramatic (23,853) compared with the prior presidential election year. The
surge occurred in 1996 because political parties discovered ways of spending soft money for cam-
paign advertisements in targeted areas throughout the nation. This new campaign strategy raised the
value of soft money considerably.
TABLE 1
Distribution of Soft Money Contributors by Organizational Type,
1992–2000
Election cycle
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Firms
—Agriculture, energy, natural resources 9 7 1 6 4
—Construction and real estate 10 7 10 7 10
—Food and entertainment 8 4 4 5 7
—Finance and insurance 1 4 9 3 5
—Industry and manufacturing 5 9 15 17 9
—Medical 6 9 6 9 4
—Sales and service 22 28 21 27 28
—Unclassified firms 27 26 30 21 22
Subtotal 88% 94% 96% 95% 89%
Associations
—Citizen and labor 1 2 1 0 1
—Trade and professional 3 1 0 3 4
—Parties and campaign organizations 4 2 3 2 3
Subtotal 8% 5% 4% 5% 8%
Unclassified 4 1 0 0 3
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Notes: The number of observations = 500, with a random sample of 100 organizations per elec-
tion cycle. Soft money data are from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).
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The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions 1143
sales/service and unclassified.13 Even though parties mobilized additional groups
starting in 1996, the distribution of organizations remained stable over several
election cycles. Given this pattern, we can make generalized inferences about
interest group behavior using 1998 election data.
Who Were Soft Money Donors?
Aggregate statistics provide a portrait of the typical soft money donor that is
startlingly at odds with conventional accounts in the news media. Groups that
gave only soft money made much smaller donations than those that gave hard
money.14 The median contribution for groups giving exclusively soft money was
only $375, while the median soft money contribution for groups that also gave
hard money was over $25,000 (see Table 2).15 Furthermore, the population of
groups making soft money contributions dwarfed the population of groups
making hard money contributions. More than 12,000 organizations made soft
money contributions in the 1998 elections, while less than 3,500 PACs made hard
money contributions. These statistics suggest that lightly regulated campaign
finance systems, akin to the soft money regime, lower the barriers to entry and
allow more groups to contribute, even though contributions may be in relatively
small amounts.
The focus of the news media has been on an elite group of donors—only 6%
of the total donor population—that provided most of the hard and soft money in
13 The unclassified groups were firms whose area of business was not obvious, but the majority of
these groups appeared to be partnerships named after their principals, which are typically law, con-
sulting, or accounting firms.
14 The measure of hard money contributions includes both direct contributions to candidates and
direct contributions to political parties.
15 We consider the median rather than the mean because there are a few large givers in both the
hard money and soft money contributor population that skew mean contributions. As a result, the
median provides a better description of a randomly drawn contributor.
TABLE 2
Distribution of Organizations that Gave Hard and Soft Money,
1997–1998
Median Median Percent of Percent of
Number of Percent of Soft Hard All Soft All Hard
Groups Groups Contribution Contribution Money Money
Soft money 11,383 76% $375 $0 41% 0%
Hard money 2,777 18% $0 $10,112 0% 39%
Both 870 6% $25,750 $78,295 59% 61%
Total 15,030 100% 100% 100%
Notes: Soft money data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP); hard money data from the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Federal Election Commission 1997).
This content downloaded from 
            128.218.42.140 on Tue, 09 Jul 2019 00:00:13 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
1144 D. E. Apollonio and Raymond J. La Raja
the system. Overall, this exclusive group of 870 contributors provided roughly
three-fifths of the hard money and three-fifths of the soft money contributed in
the 1998 election cycle.16 Interestingly, this group emphasized primarily hard
money contributions rather than soft money contributions. Their median hard
money contribution ($78,295) was more than three times larger than their median
soft money contribution ($25,750).
Within this elite group of donors, firms were clearly overrepresented. Corpo-
rations constituted 70% of the groups that made both kinds of contributions, even
though these organizations were less than half of the total population of PACs.17
Labor PACs, in contrast, represented only 5% of organizations making both hard
and soft money contributions, even though they make up 9% the PAC popula-
tion. Similarly, nonconnected PACs (a reasonable proxy for advocacy groups)
represented only 3% of dual contributors, even though they constitute 13% of all
PACs. These aggregate statistics appear to support our hypothesis that member-
ship characteristics influence the decision to make soft money contributions. 
To test this and other hypotheses we turn to a logit analysis of soft money 
contributions.
The Decision to Contribute Soft Money
The decision to make soft money contributions appears to have depended on
both membership characteristics and on organizational age, but not on revenues.18
Table 3 presents our findings for a logit model that includes variables measuring
each kind of resource.19 It appears that nonmembership groups, as measured by
firms, were dramatically more likely to contribute soft money than the compari-
son group of professional and trade associations. With all variables held at their
means, the difference in the probability of making soft money contributions for
16 To make comparisons, the FEC list of organizations sponsoring PACs that made contributions
was matched with the list of soft money contributors to identify groups that both gave soft money to
parties and gave hard money through a PAC. In the event that an organization sponsored more than
one PAC in 1997–1998, contributions from all of them were summed to measure the level of activ-
ity at the interest group level, rather than at the PAC level.
17 Aggregate statistics on PACs that gave hard and soft money are available from the authors upon
request.
18 We tested the effect of each type of resource on contributions separately before constructing a
joint model that included all of them. Consistent with previous research on other kinds of political
spending, each appeared to explain organizational behavior when taken individually. In the joint spec-
ification, only the claims of theories about membership and experience remained significant.
19 At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we also tested a number of interaction terms
between revenues, organizational age, and the type of organization. While none of these interaction
terms were significant predictors of organizational behavior, the interaction term considering the orga-
nizational age of firms (age*firm) approached significance and is consistent with the expectation that
firms are initially less motivated by politics than other kinds of organizations. As a result, we have
included it in the results provided in Table 3. The same interaction terms were also tested in the
second-stage regression, but none of them approached statistical significance.
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firms was 37 percentage points (from 9% to 46%), an increase of over four times
relative to the baseline trade association with the same revenues. Membership
groups, such as labor unions and advocacy organizations, did not appear more
likely to make contributions than trade or professional organizations. These
results support our theory that membership groups have cost-effective alterna-
tives to making political contributions. Therefore, they are less likely to contribute
soft money to political parties. We were not able to distinguish between the behav-
iors of voluntary and involuntary membership groups since neither was more
likely to make soft money contributions than a baseline trade association.
The expectation that groups would contribute soft money as they mature was
also statistically significant, although the substantive change was smaller.
Nonfirm organizations (including trade and professional groups, labor unions,
advocacy groups, and nonprofits) that had been in existence longer, all other
factors held constant, increased their probability of making soft money contri-
TABLE 3
Determinants of the Organizational Decision to Make Soft Money
Contributions, 1997–1998
Independent variable Coefficient (s.e.)
Revenues (in billions of dollars) .025
(.032)
Employees (in thousands) .009
(.014)
Firm (dummy variable) 2.230*
(.767)
Labor Union (dummy variable) .948
(1.401)
Advocacy Group (dummy variable) -1.269
(1.061)
Organizational Age (in years) .018*
(.007)
Population (in millions of groups) -.295
(2.040)
Organizational Age * Firm (interaction term) -.018
(.010)
Constant -2.998
(.563)
N 241
Log Likelihood -97.82
Pseudo R2 .18
Notes: Figures are logit regression coefficients (Stata-generated). Dependent variable is whether
an organization made a soft money contribution. The baseline (suppressed) group is trade and pro-
fessional associations. * p < .05. Soft money data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) com-
bined with authors’ compilation of organizational characteristics drawn from a variety of sources
listed in text.
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butions. For example, organizations in existence for 10 years had an 8% proba-
bility of making soft money contributions, relative to organizations that had been
in existence for 50 years, which had a 14% probability of making soft money
contributions, an increase of nearly 100%.20
The explanatory power of organizational experience is suggestive but not defin-
itive, because we use a population of organizations that consists only of politi-
cally active groups (as defined earlier), rather than the universe of soft money
contributors, many of which were not active previously in politics. However, the
expectation that among similarly situated organizations the oldest were the most
likely to engage in additional political action suggests what makes a contributor
different from a noncontributor. As we expected, organizational age enhanced the
probability that an organization would take advantage of opportunities to extend
its influence. Just as experience (age) among voters is linked to higher turnout
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), experience among organizations appears to
augment political participation through the correlation between organizational
age and learning over time (March and Olsen 1984).
The Size of Soft Money Contributions
We expected three resource factors would predict the size of soft money con-
tributions: capital (positively related), membership (negatively related), and expe-
rience (negatively related). Our sample was generated from the previous sample
that we used to predict whether an organization contributed soft money, except
we removed organizations that did not make any contributions. The results, which
are presented in Table 4, suggest that while money and experience influence con-
tributions as we expected, the role of membership has an interesting twist.
The level of organizational revenues was positively correlated with spending
levels, supporting the conventional wisdom that wealthier organizations use their
financial resources to make larger political contributions. Every billion dollars in
additional revenues was correlated with increased organizational soft money
spending of slightly more than $6,000. While the change in contribution level
was a relatively small share of the change in revenues, this increase in contribu-
tion levels is larger than the maximum possible hard money contribution that a
PAC could have made directly to a political candidate in any given election.
The measure of organizational experience was also significant. Experienced
organizations were likely to spend less on soft money than inexperienced organ-
izations. For every additional year an organization existed, it contributed $2,500
less in soft money. This finding supports our expectation that it is possible to sub-
stitute some resources for others. The soft money system enabled relatively newer
20 It seems plausible that the effect of organizational age might be nonlinear, but while we tested a
number of age transformations (age squared, age logged), none were significant in either the first or
second-stage regression. Organizations in the sample ranged in age from five years to 164 years in
existence.
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organizations to build political relationships more quickly by demonstrating
support through financial resources in lieu of personal relationships that take time
to develop. This explanation recalls the actions of Enron, a relatively young firm
that attempted to make an impression quickly with large political contributions.
The data did not fully support our hypothesis about how membership charac-
teristics drive political contributions. Nonmembership groups (firms) did not con-
tribute more soft money than other kinds of groups, even though they were more
likely to make a contribution in the first place. Earlier, we argued that nonmem-
bership groups would have a stronger incentive to make large political contribu-
tions because they have fewer resource alternatives. The results are not consistent
with this line of reasoning. In trying to explain the anomalous results showing
that firms did not contribute more than other kinds of organizations, we acknowl-
edge the overriding importance of organizational goals in driving contributor
behavior, as we explain in the discussion below.
We found support for our argument that involuntary membership groups (labor
unions) give more money than voluntary membership organizations (advocacy
TABLE 4
Determinants of the Level of Organizational Soft Money Contributions
1997–1998
Independent variable Coefficient (s.e.)
Revenues (in billions of dollars) $6,155*
(3,473)
Employees (in thousands) -$955
(1,491)
Firm (dummy variable) $34,888
(75,876)
Labor Union (dummy variable) $1,279,900*
(229,621)
Advocacy Group (dummy variable) $455,975*
(225,578)
Organizational Age (in years) -$2,498*
(934)
Population (in millions of groups) -$357,509
(333,143)
Constant $241,897
(80,492)
N 47
R2 .49
Adjusted R2 .40
Notes: Figures are logit regression coefficients (Stata-generated). Dependent variable is whether
an organization made a soft money contribution. The baseline (suppressed) group is trade and pro-
fessional associations. * p < .05. Soft money data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) com-
bined with authors’ compilation of organizational characteristics drawn from a variety of sources
listed in text.
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groups). Labor unions typically gave well over one million dollars more than sim-
ilarly situated trade associations and firms. Advocacy groups, in contrast, con-
tributed nearly half a million dollars more than comparable trade groups and
firms.21 This finding supports our belief that involuntary membership groups,
such as labor unions, find it easier to make political contributions because it is
easier for them to raise money. Through paycheck deductions labor unions receive
funds automatically from members for political contributions while most advo-
cacy organizations do not.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that interest group resources, both financial and non-
financial, affect the decision to make political contributions. While previous
studies have focused on organizational goals and the political environment to
explain interest group contribution strategies, we show that groups adjust to dif-
ferent regulatory schemes based, in part, on the breadth and depth of their orga-
nizational resources. Confirming the conventional wisdom about how wealthy
organizations exploit a campaign finance system with no contribution limits, we
found that revenues were an important factor in predicting the size of soft money
contributions. But wealth did not predict which groups would make a soft money
contribution. Instead, we found that other kinds of resources determined who
would participate, such as political experience and whether the organization
lacked members.
Older organizations were more likely to make soft money contributions, an
observation that is consistent with prior research about how organizational learn-
ing over time tends to expand the range of group activities. Among groups that
made contributions, however, younger organizations appeared to contribute more
soft money than older organizations. This observation suggests a substitution
effect, namely, that younger organizations may have used money to establish
political relationships with parties and officeholders that typically develop over
time. A campaign finance system that permits unlimited contributions, such as
the soft money system, may provide inexperienced groups access or legitimacy
more quickly than systems with contribution limits.
Membership, or the absence of members, also had an important influence on
contribution strategies. Under a campaign finance regime with no restrictions on
the source of contributions, organizations that lack members greatly expand their
participation. Federal laws on hard money contributions typically constrain
groups that lack members because they require donors to form PACs that raise
21 The larger contributions made by labor unions may also reflect the hierarchical internal structure
of these organizations. National organizations frequently receive dues from local unions and allocate
these aggregated funds according to goals established by the national organizations. The data,
however, included contributions made by local unions as well as contributions made by national and
international labor unions.
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money from at least 51 individuals. Under the soft money regime, however, non-
membership groups such as business firms could make contributions directly
from their treasuries.
The dramatic increase in giving from the business sector was among small,
local firms rather than large multinational corporations. In a random sample of
100 donors that gave only soft money, 96 organizations were business-related.
Most of these organizations were local hotels, funeral homes, construction com-
panies, towing services, dental offices, hardware stores, landscape services, legal
offices, accounting firms, and retail food outlets. The four organizations that were
not firms were two Native American tribes (Leech Lake Tribal Council, Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe) and two educational/research institutions (Sawyer College
of Business, Pathology Institute of Middle Georgia). The largest contributor in
the sample was the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, which operates Foxwoods Casino
in Connecticut, with a total of $369,000 in soft money contributions.
Based on interviews with donors and party officials we learned that national
party committees aggressively exploited mailing lists to mobilize these small
donors. The soft money regime apparently allowed party workers to attract donors
by offering the option of giving individual hard money contributions or soft
money donations through the firm.22 While many donors are reluctant to write
personal checks to the party, they had fewer inhibitions about using funds from
business accounts. Political participation among this class of small business
owners increased rapidly because the cost of contributing declined once they
could use organizational resources rather than personal funds. Thus, the soft
money regime lowered barriers to participation in politics among small donors,
even as it opened the door to potential abuses by large donors.
While our theory predicted that wealthy organizations would make large soft
money contributions, it did not explain the degree to which some membership
groups, such as labor unions and advocacy organizations, also made large con-
tributions. We argued that membership groups have a competing incentive to
mobilize members rather than donate cash. Thus, we expected nonmembership
groups—the proverbial corporate “fat cats”—to make larger contributions than
membership groups. We also expected to observe differences among member-
ship groups, with involuntary membership organizations (labor unions) con-
tributing more than voluntary organizations (advocacy groups) because
involuntary organizations can raise revenues easier.
Our model demonstrates why labor unions contribute more than advocacy
groups, but does not explain why both types of organizations tend to contribute
22 Interviews with more than 30 small donors and representatives of the six national party com-
mittees indicate that these small donations were generated by national party solicitations. While reluc-
tant to divulge details of fundraising practices, party officials averred that they contacted potential
donors by telephone and direct mail. Donors speculated that they were identified through their
involvement with local business associations, subscriptions to policy-oriented journals, and past con-
tributions to local politicians. Most had never contributed to the party in the past. This information
is based on telephone interviews by authors, 30 June–23 July 2003.
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more than firms. The results show that labor and advocacy groups are less likely
than business firms to make a soft money donation in the first place, but more
likely to make larger donations if they choose to contribute.
Our post-hoc explanation is that electoral goals provide a powerful incentive
for labor unions and advocacy groups—both of which are typically ideological
and partisan—to make large contributions to the political parties. While such
groups might also want to mobilize their members in critical races, they recog-
nize the value of supporting a political party, which allows them to pool resources
with like-minded groups to pursue a coordinated partisan campaign strategy.23
Thus, some partisan groups were more likely than firms to make large soft money
contributions because the stakes were so high for them in gaining sympathetic
legislative majorities. Their desire to create a favorable majority in Congress gives
them a strong incentive to invest money in the major political parties, whose chief
strategy is to move campaign resources into marginal districts (Gierzynski and
Breaux 1998; Herrnson 1989; Jacobson 1985–86; Malbin and Gais 1998).
To examine whether partisan goals were driving the investments of labor
unions and advocacy groups, we compared the percentage of these groups that
made contributions to a single political party to the percentage of firms that did
the same. We expected the former two groups to be party loyalists, giving mostly
to one party, while business firms, in contrast, should have used soft money con-
tributions to hedge against the possibility of a change of the party in power by
giving equally to both parties. The percentages in Table 5 indicate the degree to
which groups of each organizational type gave money exclusively to one politi-
cal party, rather than spreading contributions across both political parties.24
23 The value of having the party coordinate campaign activities is evident from recent reports about
labor unions finding it difficult to agree on a collective approach to the 2004 elections now that they
cannot work with the political party using soft money. See Leigh Strope, “Unions in Disarray on Soft
Money for ’04,” Associated Press, June 17, 2003.
24 The sample includes organizations that gave both hard money and soft money by organizational
type, using the classification system provided by the Federal Election Commission.
TABLE 5
Percentage of PACs That Gave Soft Money to One Party Only, 
by Organizational Type, 1997–1998
Number of PACs giving Percent
Number of PACs soft money to ONE party giving soft money to
giving soft money only ONE party only
Corporations 608 367 60%
Labor unions 45 40 89%
Non-connected 28 23 82%
Trade 156 91 58%
Notes: Number of observations = 870. Soft money data from the Center for Responsive Politics.
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As anticipated, labor unions and advocacy groups were much more likely to
give to a single political party with their soft money contributions. Nearly 90%
of labor unions gave exclusively to one political party. Similarly, nonconnected
PACs, which serve as a proxy for advocacy groups, were also more likely to be
party loyalists, with over 80% giving exclusively to a single political party. Cor-
porations, in contrast, were the least likely to give to one party, with only 60%
of firms contributing this way. Trade associations behaved similarly to corpora-
tions; less than 60% of these groups gave exclusively to one political party. These
patterns suggest that goals matter in the allocation of political contributions.
Given the balanced partisan composition of Congress, corporations and trade
associations appear to hedge their bets by giving to both parties, a practice that
reflects access-oriented behavior.25 Further research should examine the influence
of political context on resource allocation by observing contributions under
varying strategic conditions, including presidential elections and state elections
where partisan strength is less balanced than in Congress.
In conclusion, this study has implications for how the design of campaign
finance laws affects political participation and the representation of interests.
Based on the results of our resource model, we expect wealthy organizations to
take advantage of regulatory systems that lack contribution limits because they
use their financial resources to make large contributions. However, by limiting
the size of contributions and requiring that groups make contributions through
PACs, campaign finance rules raise the value of other kinds of resources, includ-
ing membership and experience. Organizations benefit to the degree that they can
substitute these nonfinancial resources for political activity. Large membership
organizations, such as labor unions and advocacy groups, should benefit from the
new federal laws because they appear to have the greatest capacity to substitute
for soft money contributions with direct membership mobilization and additional
hard money contributions. Experienced organizations may rely on established
reputations and political ties to gain access to policymakers.
Among nonmembership groups, those that are least likely to be affected by
source and size restrictions are the large and wealthy firms that made up the
majority of groups giving both hard and soft money. These groups were not the
majority of soft money contributors, nor were they the largest contributors, even
though a corporation like Enron provided the classic image of the corporate con-
tributor. Wealthy corporate groups will continue to spend more on politics than
other kinds of organizations because they have already formed PACs that make
extensive contributions. Indeed, as we observed earlier, the median hard money
contribution for these elite corporate groups was much larger than the median
soft money contribution. The ban on soft money affects most significantly the
25 This allocation strategy may change if Republicans expand their majorities to safer margins in
the House and Senate. In 2000, contribution strategies were influenced by the open presidential con-
tests that provided an incentive for corporations to behave more like electoral groups by supporting
George W. Bush, a pro-business Republican.
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political participation of owners or leaders of local businesses and organizations
with less than 50 employees because this group constituted the vast majority of
soft money contributors.27
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